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Outside Director Equity Compensation  
And The Monitoring Of Management 





Using a sample of firms that are first time users of outside director equity compensation, I 
examine the effect of outsider director equity compensation on director monitoring by 
investigating firm performance and earnings management.  My results, although lagged and not 
noticeable until year three, show that those firms that compensate outside directors with a higher 
percentage of equity compensation have higher stock performance, but lower accounting 
performance.  These same firms also have lower discretionary accruals (i.e., less earnings 
management).   These results suggest that outside directors do increase their monitoring by 
lowering discretionary accruals and thereby, lowering accounting earnings.  In addition, this 
increased monitoring has a positive effect on stock performance.  The results indicate that 
increased monitoring of accounting earnings results in lower discretionary accruals and thus 
lower, but more accurate earnings, and stock performance for the same period is not negatively 
impacted.  
 






n July 2009 the Southern District of California approved a $55.95 million settlement against six outside 
directors of Peregrine Systems for their role in the firm’s failure to properly recognize revenue.  This 
judgment brings the total amount paid in settlement of claims against the outside directors of Peregrine to 
$61.55 million, one of the largest settlements ever solely on behalf of outside directors (LaCroix, 2009).  Such 
lawsuits and judgments add fuel to the ongoing debate regarding the effectiveness of outside directors in the 
monitoring of management.   While there are many factors that lead to, potentially, effective monitoring of 
management by outside directors, recent scrutiny has focused on the form of compensation (cash or equity).  
Therefore, the purpose of this study is to investigate the effect the form of compensation has on the monitoring of 
management.  Specifically, this study focuses on first time adopters of an outside director equity compensation plan 
and examines firm performance (using both market and accounting measures) and discretionary accruals one, three 
and five years after plan implementation. 
 
 One reason firms use equity compensation is to provide incentives for the recipient to behave in ways that 
are in the best interest of shareholders.  Agency theory predicts that equity compensation aligns outside directors’ 
interest with those of shareholders (Elson, 1995; Jensen, 1989) by putting the outside directors’ wealth at risk 
(Jensen, 1993).  To the extent outside directors are self-interested, they can view board service (i.e., effort) as costly 
and the potential for shirking (i.e., rubber stamping) exists.  This behavior could be exacerbated in firms with large 
investment and growth opportunities because the level of effort required to gather information and monitor 
management is sizable given the proprietary and specialized knowledge of management (Smith and Watts, 1992).  
Equity compensation, therefore, will alleviate these barriers to effective monitoring and improve an outside 
directors’ incentive to maximize shareholder wealth (Maug, 1998).   
 
 The use of equity compensation, however, is not without concerns.  While outside directors should make 
decisions with the goal of maximizing the long term wealth of owners (Sternberg, 2001), outside directors must not 
benefit at the expense of either shareholders or the corporation (Johnson et al., 2000).   Equity compensation could 
I 
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be problematic since outside board members could set their compensation levels and performance targets (Dalton 
and Daily, 2001); focus on short term time horizons, if they are overly concerned with their present wealth instead of 
long term wealth effects (Daily and Dalton, 2002); and are in a position to directly influence stock price (Barrier, 
2002).  These concerns about directors’ self-interest and potential wealth creation have been shown in the repricing 
of common stock (Arya and Sun 2004; Daily et al., 2002) and initial public offerings (Dalton et al., 2003). 
 
 Given the contrasting views on the efficacy of using equity in outside director compensation plans, I test 
the effect of equity compensation on two measures of outside director monitoring—firm performance and 
discretionary accruals.  Equity compensation should reduce agency costs between outside directors and 
shareholders, enhancing firm performance.  Cordeiro et al. (2007) find a positive relationship between equity 
compensation and stock returns, especially in firms with higher investment opportunities.  I further investigate firm 
performance by testing accounting performance.  Since accounting earnings do not include market wide changes to 
discount rates, earnings capture firm specific changes more under the directors’ monitoring capacity.  Fich and 
Shivdasani (2007) find a positive relationship between the existence of an equity plan and asset turnover, return on 
sales and return on assets. 
 
Additionally, earnings management provides insight into monitoring of the financial reporting process—a 
specific duty of outside directors.  Accruals are a necessary component in financial statements prepared in 
accordance with the standards set forth by the Financial Accounting Standards Board for public companies (those 
companies under the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission.)  Fundamentally, accruals are used to 
match expenses with the revenues they help create in a given accounting period
1
.  Thus, some level of accruals is 
expected, and in and of itself, not reflective of management bias or a lack of director monitoring.  Discretionary 
accruals, on the other hand, capture the amount of accruals that are managed.  These discretionary accruals could be 
reflective of earnings management (either up or down) to meet a predetermined target.  Regardless of the target (i.e., 
analyst forecast, performance measure, debt covenant), discretionary accruals decrease the representational 
faithfulness of financial reporting.  Bédard et al. (2004) find that the ratio of outside director stock options that can 
be exercised in the short run relative to the total number of options held increases the probability that a firm will 
have discretionary accruals.  Similarly, Boumosleh (2009) finds that the extent outside director option compensation 
is positively associated with total accruals.    
 
I extend this research by examining the extent to which outside director equity compensation increases 
outside director monitoring as reflected in stock returns, return on assets, and discretionary accruals.  I find that 
percentage of equity compensation, relative to total compensation, is positively (negatively) associated with stock 
returns (return on assets and discretionary accruals).  These results are unique in that I am not testing the inclusion of 
equity, but rather the percentage of equity received in total compensation.  Since all firms in my sample are 
receiving some level of equity, the results suggest that higher percentages of equity induce more monitoring.  The 
results on stock performance are similar to Cordeiro et al. (2007), but extend that research by investigating 
accounting returns for a sample from a similar time period.  The results on the discretionary accrual measures are 
opposite of Boumosleh (2009), but I do extend that research by investigating a more sophisticated measure of 
earnings management, discretionary accruals, rather than total accruals.              
 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the literature review and hypotheses 
development.  Section 3 describes the research design and data.  Section 4 provides the empirical results and the 
paper is concluded in section 5.  
 
2. PREVIOUS LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
 The specter of corporate governance is that management will engage in self interested behaviors at the 
expense of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  Therefore, boards of directors (among other governance 
features) are put in place on the authority of shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983a) to have ultimate responsibility 
                                                 
1 For example, accounts receivables are presented on the balance sheet at their “net realizable value,” the historical cost of the 
receivables less the estimated “allowance for doubtful accounts.”  The estimated “allowance for doubtful accounts” is the accrual 
that is reflected on the income statement as “bad debt expense.” 
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for decision making in the firm (Fama and Jensen, 1983b; Jensen 1983).  The board of directors, therefore, is the 
mechanism by which management is monitored and ultimately disciplined (Fama, 1980; Jensen, 1983).  Within this 
relationship between the outside directors and shareholders, however, there is an inherent conflict of interest—what 
Williamson (1984) refers to as secondary or cascading agency costs.  The fundamental problem with this secondary 
agency relationship is that outside directors are not bonded with shareholders.  That is, the outside directors are not 
tied, financially, to the results of the firm.  Therefore, many scholars (for example Elson 1996; Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 
1989) and professional organizations (see the National Association of Corporate Directors Blue Ribbon Report, 
1995) have cited equity compensation as the solution to this bonding problem.   
 
 Equity compensation, in particular stock options, has a long and well-studied history in the executive 
compensation literature (for a thorough summary see Murphy, 1999).  The reasoning behind the use of stock options 
in director compensation schemes is similar to executive compensation.  Shareholders generally favor investment in 
risky projects, like R&D, because the investment can potentially increase firm value, but the shareholders can 
diversify their risk by holding a portfolio of investments.  On the other hand, management has incentives to under 
invest in R&D.  Management could avoid investments in R&D because the investment has a high probability of 
failure (Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998) and the effects of the investment are long term.  That is, the rewards of the 
R&D investment could not be realized until well after the manger has left the firm (Rumlet, 1987).  Outside 
directors, therefore, could be inclined to take a managerial approach to investment in R&D (and other risky projects) 
since they serve at the pleasure of management (Davis and Thompson, 1994).  Option compensation, thus, allows 
the outside director to share in firm gains from investment in risky projects in the same way as shareholders.  
 
2.1   Outside Director Compensation and Firm Performance 
 
Shareholders rely on outside directors to maximize shareholder wealth (Sternberg, 2001).  Firm 
performance, in particular, is used to help assess wealth returns.  One measure of firm performance is stock returns.  
Corderio, et al. (2007) find a positive relationship between the ratio of equity compensation and stock returns.  One 
limitation of stock price measures of performance, however, is that all variation in stock price cannot be explained 
by managerial or director action.  Previous research finds that variation in stock returns can be explained by both 
market wide shocks to discount rates and expected cash flows, an accounting measure (Campbell, 1990; Fama 
1990).  In fact, Fama (1976) shows that one-quarter to one-third of the variation in a firm’s stock returns are 
explained by market wide fluctuations in discount rates.   
 
Boumsoleh (2009) argues that director compensation contracts are becoming more similar to executive 
compensation contracts and, thus, provide similar incentives.   Therefore, given that stock returns are assumed to be 
a noisy measure of performance as market wide fluctuations in the discount rate provide uncontrollable noise into 
the signal, outside directors can also be evaluated using accounting measures of performance.  Accounting earnings 
provide information about a firm’s current and future cash flow generating ability (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986).  
Since generally accepted accounting principles do not include the impact of market wide changes in discount rates 
on the computation of earnings, earnings are more sensitive to firm specific changes in value and reflect factors 
more under executive (in this case director) control (Lambert and Larcker, 1987; Sloan, 1993).  Furthermore, since 
most firm debt is not publically traded, accounting earnings (with interest expense added back) are a beneficial 
indicator of changes in the value (stock plus debt) of the firm (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986).  Therefore, the 
hypothesis in its alternative form is: 
 
H1: Firm performance, as measured by stock returns and accounting earnings, is positively associated with 
outside director equity compensation.  
 
2.2   Outside Director Compensation and Earnings Management 
 
 While stock options do put the recipient’s wealth at risk, the literature on executive stock options suggest 
that incentives from stock options can be associated with earnings management through the manipulation of 
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accruals
2
.  The literature on stock options and earnings management focuses on two similar, but distinct behaviors.  
The first focuses on earnings management around the issuance and exercise of stock options.  The second 
investigates the relationship between compensation structure and earnings management.   
 
 Since stock prices react favorably to good news and negatively to bad news, executives could have 
incentives to manage the flow of information from their firm to shareholders.  Aboody and Kasznik (2000), focusing 
on firms with scheduled option awards, find that executives who receive options before the earnings announcement 
are more likely to issue bad news and less likely to issue good news forecasts than are those executives who receive 
options after the earnings announcement date.  Similarly, Chauvin and Shenoy (2001) find that stock returns are 
negative for the period preceding stock option awards.  These results suggest that managers are able to inflate the 
value of options by timing the release of earnings news announcements.  Yermack (1997) finds that managers 
influence the timing of awards rather than the timing of disclosures by showing positive abnormal stock returns 
following the option award date.  Extending this notion, Baker et al. (2003) find that executives with high option 
compensation are associated with income decreasing accruals in periods prior to option award dates.   In either 
situation, managers are able to extract wealth from shareholders by manipulating firm events.   
 
 Focusing on compensation structure, Gao and Shrieves (2002) find a negative (positive) relationship 
between cash (equity) and discretionary accruals.  Similarly, Cheng and Warfield (2005) report greater earnings 
management (defined as using discretionary accruals to meet or beat analyst forecast) in firms that rely more heavily 
on equity compensation.  Furthermore, Meek et al. (2007) find that the relationship between equity compensation 
and discretionary accruals can be moderated by firm size, growth and time period.  Collectively, these studies 
provide evidence that equity compensation is positively associated with earnings management. 
 
 The quantity of evidence that investigates the effect of outside director equity compensation on earnings 
management is limited
3
.  Earnings management, according to Healy and Wahlen (1999:368) occurs “when managers 
use judgment in financial reporting and structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some 
stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the firm or to influence contractual outcomes that 
depend on reported accounting numbers.”  Accruals, in particular discretionary accruals, and earnings management 
are used synonymously in the literature (Kothari, 2001).   
 
 To date, only two studies have directly investigated outside director stock options and earnings 
management.  Bédard et al. (2004) find that the ratio of stock options that can be exercised in the short run relative 
to the total of options and stock held by outside directors on the audit committee increases the probability that a firm 
will engage in discretionary accruals.  Their findings suggest that stock options reduce the monitoring of earnings 
management to either increase earnings in the current period (positive discretionary accruals) or to accumulate 
reserves (negative discretionary accruals) to be used in subsequent years to increase earnings and, therefore, the 
value of the stock option.  Boumosleh (2009) finds that the extent of equity compensation is positively associated 
with total accruals.  This finding holds using the cumulative effect of equity compensation, implying that as outside 
directors receive more equity compensation over time they continue to manage earnings through accrual 
manipulation since their wealth (as represented by their increasing equity stake) is sensitive to changes in firm value.  
Both of these studies, in contrast to this study, take a cross-sectional approach to investigate outside director 
compensation structure and accruals.   
 
 There is a distinction between measuring total accruals and discretionary accruals.  As stated previously, 
accruals are a necessary component of financial reporting.  Therefore, research has put considerable effort into 
distinguishing between legitimate accruals (nondiscretionary) versus managed (discretionary) accruals.  Prior 
                                                 
2 Prior literature has also focused on option compensation and dividend policy.  Option holders have incentives to avoid paying 
dividends since dividends reduce the value of the option and the option holder has no claim to the dividends (Merton, 1973).  
Lambert et al. (1989) find evidence that dividend payout ratios decrease relative to expected levels after the adoption of an 
executive stock option plan.  Lewellen et al. (1987) find similar results. 
3 Previous research has shown that directors self-interestedly create wealth, at perhaps the expense of shareholders, during events 
like an initial public offering (Dalton et al., 2003), option repricing (Arya and Sun, 2004; Daily et al., 2002) and mergers and 
acquisitions (Certo et al., 2008).  They, however, do not test earnings management through the manipulation of accruals. 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – November/December 2012 Volume 28, Number 6 
© 2012 The Clute Institute http://www.cluteinstitute.com/  1319 
research has shown earnings management as measured by discretionary accruals in situations as diverse as executive 
compensation contracts (Healy, 1985), litigation awards (Hall and Stammerjohan, 1997), and regulatory hearings 
(Key 1997).
4
  Therefore, using a discretionary accrual model helps capture earnings management, the accruals that 
truly are at management’s discretion and not effectively monitored by outside directors.  The second hypothesis in 
alternative form is as follows: 
 
H2: Discretionary accruals are positively associated with outside director equity compensation.  
 
3. DATA AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1   Empirical Specification 
 
The test variable in this study is director equity mix (DEM), the dollar value of equity compensation 
divided by the dollar value of total compensation.  Total compensation is the aggregate of cash compensation (the 
total dollar amount of board retainers plus the meeting fee times the number of full board meetings) and equity 
compensation.  Equity compensation is valued as the number of options awarded times the per-option value derived 
using the Black-Scholes (1973) option-pricing formula.  Similar to prior studies (e.g., Certo et al., 2008) I assume 
the options are awarded at the money and the time to maturity is ten years.  
 
3.1.1  Outside Director Equity Compensation and Firm Performance 
 
The first hypothesis of this paper is whether director equity mix (DEM) is positively associated with 
measures of firm performance.  I distinguish between stock returns and accounting returns in my empirical models.  
For both measures of performance I calculate the one-year, three- and five-year industry adjusted average.  Stock 
based performance, stock returns (RTN), is measured as average monthly return of a firm’s stock over the period of 
interest minus the firm’s two-digit SIC average monthly return divided by the standard deviation of the industry 
average monthly returns over the desired time period.   
 
Return on assets (ROA) is used to measure accounting returns.  Although prior literature has used return on 
equity as an accounting proxy (Ryan and Wiggins, 2004), industry adjusted return on assets is used in this study.  
Unlike return on equity, return on assets captures how assets are efficiently used, more fully capturing events 
monitored by the outside directors.  It is calculated as the difference between a firm’s return on assets (calculated as 
income from continuing operations before interest expense and taxes divided by average total assets) and the firm’s 
two-digit SIC average return on assets, divided by the standard deviation of the average industry return on assets for 
the desired time period. 
 
The regressions on firm performance also include variables for the firm’s corporate governance structure 
and agency cost characteristics.  Board size (BDS) is included to control for the negative relationship between board 
size and firm valuation (Yermack, 1996).  The number of board meetings (BDM) is used as a control because firm 
performance increases with an increase in the number of board meetings (Vafeas, 1999).  Board independence 
(OUT) is measured as the percentage of outside directors on the board, since board independence enhances firm 
value (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991).  Management entrenchment is captured by insider ownership (INO), and is 
the percentage of common shares owned by executive management (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991).  Size (SZE) is 
the natural log of total assets.  The percentage of CEO cash compensation (CCC) is used to capture potential 
incentive effects of the CEO compensation mix.  The more cash in a CEO’s compensation scheme the less likely 
they would manage towards market measures of performance.  
 
I use an ordinary least squares regression model to test the relationship between outside director equity 
compensation and firm performance.  Specifically, I run regressions of firm performance (stock returns and 
accounting returns) over the proportion of equity in total compensation.  Hypothesis one, that outside director equity 
compensation increases the monitoring activities of outside directors, thereby reducing the agency costs between 
outside directors and shareholders, predicts a positive relationship between the mix of equity compensation and firm 
                                                 
4 See Dechow and Schrand (2004) for a thorough review of all earnings management literature. 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – November/December 2012 Volume 28, Number 6 
1320 http://www.cluteinstitute.com/  © 2012 The Clute Institute 
performance.  In the regression firm performance is defined as either stock returns or return on assets
5
.  For each 
performance measure, I calculate the one year return and the three- and five-year average return.  Control variables 
are also their values at one, three and five years after the plan adoption.  The regression equation is as follows:  
 
DEPk,t = βo + β1DEMk.,t +β2BDSk,t + β3BDMk,t +β4OUTk,t + β5INOk,t + β6SZEk,t + β7CCCk,t + errork,t 
 
Where k indicates the firm and t indicates the year; 
 
DEPk,t  = one of two variables: stock returns (RTN) measured as average monthly return of a firm’s stock over 
the period of interest minus the firm’s two-digit SIC average monthly return divided by the standard 
deviation of the industry average monthly returns over the desired time period; or return on assets 
(ROA) calculated as the difference between a firm’s return on assets (calculated as income from 
continuing operations before interest expense and taxes divided by average total assets) and the firm’s 
two-digit SIC average return on assets, divided by the standard deviation of the average industry return 
on assets for the desired time period. 
 
DEMk,t  = director equity mix, calculated as the dollar value of equity compensation divided by the dollar value 
of total compensation 
 
BDSk,t  = board size, calculated as the total number of board members 
 
BDMk,t  = board meetings, calculated as the total number of full board meetings during the year 
 
OUTk,t  = percentage of outside board members, calculated as the number of outside board members divided by 
the total number of board members 
 
INOk,t,  = insider ownership, calculated as the percentage of common shares owned by executive management 
 
SZEk,t  = size, calculated as the natural log of total assets 
 
CCCk,t  = CEO cash compensation, calculated as the total dollar value of CEO cash compensation divided by 
total compensation 
 
3.1.2   Outside Director Compensation and Discretionary Accruals 
 
The second hypothesis tested in this study is whether director equity mix (DEM) is positively associated 
with discretionary accruals (DA).   First, however, total accruals must be calculated.  I calculate total accruals using 
a cash-flow model as used in Hribar and Collins (2002) because of measurement error that potentially exists in using 
a balance sheet approach.  Hribar and Collins (2002) find that the articulation between changes in balance sheet 
accounts (working capital) and income statement accounts (accrued revenues and expenses) breaks down when non-
operating events are present (mergers and acquisitions, divestitures and foreign translations).  Thus, total accruals 
are calculated as follows: 
 
Total Accruals = (Earnings before income taxes – cash flows)/ lag assets (1) 
 
Where earnings is income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations, cash flow is net operating cash 
flow, and assets are the total assets at the beginning of the year. 
 
 Discretionary accruals are then estimated using the cross-sectional Jones (1991) model with piecewise 
modifications, as suggested by Ball and Shivakumar (2006).  The Jones (1991) model totals accruals as a function of 
the change in revenues and the level of property, plant and equipment (β1 and β2 in Equation 2, below).  The 
                                                 
5 The regression was re-estimated with market-to-book and earnings per share as measures of firm performance.  The results were 
consistent across all years tested. 
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adjustments recommended by Ball and Shivakumar (2006) control for current period performance and timing of 
gain and loss recognition (β3, β4 and β5 in Equation 2, below).  Model specification is improved with the adjustments 
as shown in tests conducted by Ball and Shivakumar (2006).   The model is specified as follows:    
 
Total accruals = β0 + β1Change in revenue + β2 Property, plant and equipment +β3Cash flows + β4Negative cash 
flows + β5(Cash flows X Negative cash flows)+error (2) 
 
Where the change in revenue is the one year change in net sales, property, plant and equipment is the gross property, 
plant and equipment, cash flows is the net operating cash flows, and negative cash flows is a dummy variable, 1 if 
the operating cash flow is less than zero.  All variables except negative cash flows are scaled by lagged total assets.  
Equation (2) is estimated cross-sectionally for each two-digit SIC grouping and year combination.  Prediction errors 
from the OLS parameter estimates in Equation (2) represent the firm’s discretionary accruals (DA). 
 
 The regressions on discretionary accruals also control for leverage, market-to-book, cash flows and outside 
directors.  Previous studies (e.g., Becker et al., 1998; Frankel et al., 2002; Menon and Williams, 2004) have shown a 
positive relationship between discretionary accruals and leverage and market-to-book.  Leverage (LVG) is the sum 
of long term debt and the portion of long term debt in current liabilities scaled by total assets.  While debt does serve 
as an external monitor of management, those companies near debt constraints could be motivated to manage 
earnings (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994).  Market-to-book (MTB) is market capitalization plus the book value of 
long term debt scaled by total assets.  It is used to capture the growth opportunities of firms, perhaps allowing 
managers more discretion in making accounting judgments.  Cash flows (CFL), operating cash flows scaled by total 
assets, is included because they have been shown to vary inversely with discretionary accruals (Dechow et al., 
1995).   Percentage of outsiders (OUT) on the board is used to capture board independence as more independent 
boards are more likely to monitor management.         
 
I test hypothesis two, the effect of director equity mix (DEM) on discretionary accruals, also on measures 
one, three and five years after plan adoption.  Again, control variables are their values one, three, and five years after 
plan adoption.  A positive relationship is predicted indicating that equity compensation is associated with higher 
accruals indicating lax monitoring creating the potential for earnings manipulation.  The equation for this regression 
is as follows: 
 
DAk,t  = β0 + β1DEMk,t + β2CFLk,t + β3LVGk,t + β4MTBk,t + β5OUTk,t + error 
 
Where k indicates the firm and t indicates the year; 
 
DEMk,t  =  director equity mix, calculated as the dollar value of equity compensation divided by the dollar value 
of total compensation 
 
CFLk,t   = cash flows, calculated as operating cash flows scaled by total assets 
 
LVGk,t  = leverage, calculated as the sum of long term debt and the portion of long term debt in current liabilities 
scaled by total assets 
 
MTBk,t  = market-to-book, calculated as market capitalization plus the book value of long term debt scaled by 
total assets 
 
OUTk,t  = percentage of outside board members, calculated as the number of outside board members divided by 
the total number of board members 
 
3.2   Data and Sample 
 
 To test the hypotheses in the paper, I use a sample of firms that are first time adopters of an outside director 
compensation plan that includes equity from the period 1997-2000.  I use first time adopters because it provides an 
opportunity to measure director behavior around the time the equity compensation plan is adopted.   This sample of 
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firms allows me to investigate the initial effect equity compensation has on outside director monitoring.  This 
method is in contrast to studies that more broadly investigate the cross-sectional relationship between director 
compensation structure and performance/accruals.  I chose the period (1997-2000) for several reasons.  First, the 
National Association of Corporate Directors issued its Blue Ribbon Report in 1995 that recommended the use of 
equity compensation.  Also, in 1996 the SEC relaxed the provisions of Rule 16b-3 allowing companies more 
discretion to issue stock options.  Thus, by 1997 firms that had not used equity compensation (because, perhaps, 
they did not have an appealing investment opportunity set, Cordeiro et al. 2007; Fich and Shivdasani, 2005; Linn 
and Park, 2005) could be feeling pressure to do so since it was not only recommended but easier to do.  Second, the 
period is before the Enron scandal and the increased level of scrutiny from all parties (e.g., auditors, regulators, 
Congress) involved in the financial reporting process.  Thus, director performance is more likely to be the result of 
compensation changes than other factors.   
 
To create a sample of first time adopters I queried the Standard & Poor’s ExecuComp database for all firms 
that had outside directors who received zero equity compensation in 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000.  The initial sample 
included 734 firms, of those 415 financial services or utility firms were excluded because they operate in an industry 
in which government regulation acts as an additional layer of monitoring.  Next, individual queries on each of the 
remaining 319 firms were performed to identify the first year outside directors received either stock grants or stock 
options.  One hundred eighty seven firms were eliminated because equity compensation has been used in previous 
years.  Of the 132 remaining firms, 16 firms were eliminated because financial information was not available and 27 
were eliminated because they did not have 5 years of additional financial information beyond the plan adoption date 
due to either mergers/ acquisitions (23) or delisting of trading securities (4).   
 
 Thus, there is a final sample of 89 firms used to test hypothesis one related to firm performance.  
Hypothesis two, related to discretionary accruals, has a final sample of 81, as 8 firms were eliminated due to 
incomplete information.  Once a firm was identified as feasible and plan adoption date identified, financial variables 
were obtained from Compustat while market related data were obtained from CRSP.  Board of director variables 
such as compensation and composition are collected from firm proxy statements filed on the Securities and 




Distribution of sample firms by year of equity plan adoption and Standard Industry Code (SIC) 
Panel A: The distribution by year of equity plan adoption 
Year of equity plan adoption Number of firms in sample 
  1997     9   
  1998     25   
  1999     26   
  2000     29   
      Total 89   
Panel B: The distribution by SIC 
SIC Industry Description Firms in sample 
1 Primary 6 
2 Manufacturing- nondurables 16 
3 Manufacturing- durables 27 
4 Transportation 6 
5 Wholesalers and Retailers 12 
7 Business Services 22 




4.1  Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 2 contains summary statistics for selected variables.  Panel A reports descriptive statistics for the 
variables used to test hypothesis one related to firm performance.   The average firm had total assets of $2.9 million.  
The average board had 9 members, 62% being outsiders, and met 6.6 times a year.  Equity, on average, comprised 
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55% of the directors’ compensation and 43% of the CEO’s compensation.  Additionally, insiders owned 13.3% of 
outstanding stock.  It is clear from Panel A that equity is a significant portion of the directors’ compensation.   
 
 Panel B of Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the variables used to test hypothesis two related to 
discretionary accruals.  Even though sample size does decrease from hypothesis one to hypothesis two, common 
variables like director equity mix and the percentage of outsiders on the board do not significantly change from 
Panel A.  Operating cash flows, on average, were 11% of total assets.    The average firm had a market-to-book ratio 
of 2.47 and used leverage about 50% of the time.  The high amount of leverage might explain why, on average, 
these firms might be perceived as late adopters of an outside director equity plan. 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics of all variables at the time of equity plan adoption 
Panel A:  Sample to test firm performance, (89 observations) 
Variables Mean Median Maximum Minimum Standard Deviation 
     RTN .01 .01 .23 -.09 .05 
     ROA .06 .06 .22 -.30 .06 
     DEM .55 .54 1.00 .06 .28 
     BDS 9.10 9.00 16.00 4.00 2.75 
     BDM 6.67 6.00 18.00 2.00 2.86 
     OUT .62 .64 .92 .25 .16 
     INO .13 .09 .72 .01 .13 
     SZE 2,926.830 1,122.410 30,891.700 50.840 4,638.310 
     CCC .57 .53 1.00 .00 .28 
Panel B: Sample to test discretionary accruals, (81 observations) 
Variables Mean Median Maximum Minimum Standard Deviation 
     DA .03 .02 .27 -.18 .06 
     DEM .54 .49 1.00 .06 .28 
     CFL .12 .11 .43 -.07 .08 
     LVG .50 .53 .84 .14 .17 
     MTB 2.47 1.71 10.81 .38 2.16 
     OUT .62 .63 .92 .25 .16 
Variable definitions      
RTN is stock returns, measured as average monthly return of a firm’s stock over the period of interest minus the firm’s two-digit 
SIC average monthly return divided by the standard deviation of the industry average monthly returns over the desired time 
period 
ROA is return on assets, calculated as the difference between a firm’s return on assets (calculated as income from continuing 
operations before interest expense and taxes divided by average total assets) and the firm’s two-digit SIC average return on 
assets, divided by the standard deviation of the average industry return on assets for the desired time period. 
DEM is director equity mix, calculated as the dollar value of equity compensation divided by the dollar value of total 
compensation 
BDS is board size, calculated as the total number of board members 
BDM is board meetings, calculated as the total number of full board meetings during the year 
OUT is the percentage of outside board members, calculated as the number of outside board members divided by the total 
number of board members 
INO is insider ownership, calculated as the percentage of common shares owned by executive management 
SZE is firm size, calculated as the natural log of total assets 
CCC is CEO cash compensation, calculated as the total dollar value of CEO cash compensation divided by total compensation 
DA is discretionary accruals, calculated using the cross-sectional Jones (1991) model with piecewise modifications, as suggested 
by Ball and Shivakumar (2006). 
CFL is cash flows, calculated as operating cash flows scaled by total assets 
LVG is leverage, calculated as the sum of long term debt and the portion of long term in current liabilities scaled by total assets 
MTB is market-to-book, calculated as market capitalization plus the book value of long term debt scaled by total assets 
 
4.2   Univariate Analyses 
 
Tables 3 and 4 provide the correlation matrices for the independent variables used to test hypothesis one, 
related to firm performance and hypothesis two, related to discretionary accruals.  The variables shown are for the 
period one-year after plan adoption, except for director equity mix, the equity mix at the time of adoption.  
The Journal of Applied Business Research – November/December 2012 Volume 28, Number 6 
1324 http://www.cluteinstitute.com/  © 2012 The Clute Institute 
Performance variables and discretionary accruals are also included for three and five years after plan adoption.   
Generally, the correlations between the independent variables do not suggest that multicollinearity is a problem. The 
correlation between director equity mix and stock returns is positive for all years presented.  This result is consistent 
with the prediction that equity compensation motivates outside directors to increase their monitoring activities to 
maximize shareholder value.  Contrary to my argument, however, is the negative correlation between director equity 
mix and return on assets, especially in years three and five.  Additionally, the negative correlation between director 
equity mix and discretionary accruals is contrary to my prediction suggesting that equity compensation does provide 
motivation to aggressively monitor management.    
 
Table 3 
Correlation matrix for variables used to test firm performance (89 observations) 
   RTN 












RTN year 1 1.00       
RTN year 3 .91*** 1.00      
RTN year 5 .84*** .98*** 1.00     
ROA year 1 .14 .15 .09 1.00    
ROA year 3 .06 .14 .12 .82*** 1.00   
ROA year 5 -.17 -.27* -.27* .45*** .63*** 1.00  
DEM .26* .33** .34*** -.03 -.17 -.28***  
BDS -.21** -.32** -.37*** .01 .01 .10  
BDM .16 .19† .18† -.11 -.19† -.40**  
OUT -.20† -.19† -.18† .08 .02 .01  
INO -.10 -.12 -.15 .06 -.05 -.01  
SZE .17 .10 .06 .25* .36*** .29**  
CCC .07 .18†* .20† .13 .10 -.03  
          
   DEM BDS BDM OUT INO SZE  
DEM 1.00***       
BDS -.46*** 1.00      
BDM 0.04*** -.06 1.00     
OUT -.17*** .11 -.01 1.00    
INO 0.08*** -.03 -.03 -.11 1.00   
SZE -.12*** .37*** .03 -.06 -.25**** 1.00  
CCCC 0.09*** -.28** .05 -.12 .19† -.28***  
†denotes significance at p< .10 
* denotes significance at p< .05 
** denotes significance at p< .01 
*** denotes significance at p< .001 




Correlation matrix for variables used to test discretionary accruals (81 observations) 






DEM CFL LVG MYB OUT 
DA year 1  1.00        
DA year 3  .21† 1.00       
DA year 5  .17 .56*** 1.00      
DEM  .05 -.15 -.24*** 1.00     
CFL  .07 .01 -.24*** 0.13 1.00    
LVG  -.09 -.01 -.08 -.36*** -.44*** 1.00   
MTB  .16 .03 .10 .45*** 0.35*** -.37*** 1.00***  
OUT  -.01 -.14 -.08 -.13 0.13 0.13 -.12 1.00 
†denotes significance at p< .10 
* denotes significance at p< .05 
** denotes significance at p< .01 
*** denotes significance at p< .001 
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4.3   Multivariate Analyses 
 
Panel A of Table 5 presents the results of using stock returns as the dependent variable, while Panel B 
shows the results of using return on assets.  In both panels column (1) presents the one-year return, column (2) 
presents the three-year average and column (3) presents the five-year average.  Hypothesis one predicts a positive 
relationship between the mix of equity compensation and stock returns.  Consistent with earlier work (Cordeiro et 
al., 2007) equity compensation is positively related to stock returns.  However, as Panel A, column (1) indicates that 
positive relationship is not evident the first year after equity compensation, but rather in year three.  Furthermore, as 
Panel B reports, the significant relationship carries over to year five.  Panel B, indicates a similar lagged trend with 
the effect of equity compensation not noticeable until years three and five when using return on assets as the 
dependent variable.  The results, however, indicate a negative relationship between director equity mix and return on 
assets.  Thus, the results only partially support hypothesis one, since the relationship between equity compensation 
and accounting earnings is negative. 
 
Table 6 presents the results of the regression for hypothesis two regarding discretionary accruals.  Similar 
to the results in Table 5, the effect of the equity compensation is lagged.  Column (1) indicates no relationship 
between equity compensation and discretionary accruals, while columns (2) and (3) show a significant and negative 
relationship between equity and discretionary accruals.  The results are contrary to hypothesis two, suggesting that 
more equity compensation provides incentives for directors to aggressively monitor management by decreasing 
unnecessary, or discretionary accruals.     
 
Table 5 
Test for the effects of equity compensation on firm performance  
as measured by stock returns and return on assets (89 observations) 
Panel A: Dependent variable: Stock Returns 









Intercept -0.13 (-1.55) -0.13 (-2.37) -0.07 (-1.86) 
DEM 0.03 (1.62) 0.03  (2.17)** 0.02 (2.00)** 
BDS -0.01 (-1.38) -0.01  (-2.38)** -0.01 (-2.78) 
BDM 0.01 (1.31) 0.01 (0.27) 0.01 (0.05) 
OUT -0.04 (-1.30) 0.02 (0.84) 0.01 (0.09) 
INO -0.03 (-.81) -0.02 (-0.79) -0.03 (-1.17) 
SZE 0.01 (2.10)* 0.01 (2.98)** 0.01 (3.07)** 
CCC 0.01 (0.61) 0.02  (1.56) 0.01 (1.58) 
F-value   2.67**  4.14***  4.89*** 
Model R2   .19  .26  .30 
Panel B: Dependent variable: Return on Assets 
  Coefficient (t-statistic) 
Variables  Year +1 Year +3 Year +5 
Intercept -0.32 (-2.77) -0.35 (-3.34) -0.17 (-1.35) 
DEM -0.01 (-0.32) -0.05 (-1.97)* -0.07 (-2.25)** 
BDS -0.01 (-0.91) -0.01 (-1.58) -0.01  (-0.92) 
BDM -0.01 (-1.29) -0.01 (-2.69)** -0.01 (-2.54)** 
OUT 0.06 (1.39) -0.01 (-0.16) 0.04 (0.68) 
INO 0.06 (1.16) 0.02 (0.43) 0.10 (1.29) 
SZE 0.02 (3.34)*** 0.02 (5.22)*** 0.02 (2.79)** 
CCC 0.05 (1.93)† 0.05 (2.00)**  0.01 (0.12) 
F-value  2.17**  6.02***   3.44*** 
Model R2  .16  .34  .23 
†denotes significance at p< .10 
* denotes significance at p< .05 
** denotes significance at p< .01 
*** denotes significance at p< .001 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
This research investigates the effect of outside director equity compensation on director monitoring, by 
examining its relationship with firm performance and earnings management.  While previous research suggests that 
firm performance increases as equity compensation increases (Cordeiro et al., 2007), I find that to be only partially 
correct.  Investigating both stock returns and accounting earnings measures, I find that outside director equity 
compensation is positively (negatively) associated with stock returns (accounting earnings), which is partially 
consistent with the findings of (Cordeiro et al., (2007).  Further, previous research suggests that outside director 
equity compensation provides incentives for outside directors to compromise their monitoring responsibility as 
indicated by a strong positive association with total accruals (Boumosleh, 2009).  Contrary to those results, I find 
that outside director compensation is negatively associated with discretionary accruals.   
 
Table 6 
Test for the effects of equity compensation on discretionary accruals (81 observations) 









Intercept .03 (0.56) 0.13  (1.53) 0.10 (1.67) 
DEM 0-.01 (-0.28) -.31  (-1.72)* 0-.08  (-2.21)** 
CFL -.01 (-0.04) -.01  (0.04) -.32 (-2.48)** 
LVG 0-.02 (-0.31) -.02  (-0.26) 0-.06 (-1.03) 
MTB .01 (1.23) 0.01 (0.71) 0.01 (0.73) 
OUT .01 (0.17) -.1 (-1.31) .06 (1.03) 
F-value   3.33***  2.00***  2.26*** 
Model R2 *    .18  .12  .13 
†denotes significance at p< .10 
* denotes significance at p< .05 
** denotes significance at p< .01 
*** denotes significance at p< .001 
 
 In isolation, my firm performance results suggest that outside directors could be acting self-interestingly by 
engaging in behavior that increases stock performance to the detriment of accounting earnings.  However, when 
taking into account the relationship with discretionary accruals, a different interpretation unfolds.  I would argue that 
outside directors with a higher percentage of equity compensation monitor more by decreasing abnormal accruals, 
thereby reducing accounting earnings and making them more accurate.  The positive association with stock 
performance suggests that equity compensation is also increasing the monitoring of firm-level investment decisions.   
 
This research contributes to the literature in a number of ways.  First, it adds additional evidence on the 
debate surrounding outside director equity compensation.  Prior studies have individually investigated firm 
performance (Cordeiro et al., 2007) and earnings management (Boumosleh, 2009) and show contrasting results.  My 
study adds another piece of evidence on the monitoring effects of outside director equity by investigating 
performance and earnings management at the same time.  Second, this study explores a unique research setting.  I 
argue that many of the variables used in governance studies like board independence, compensation, performance 
and other observed outcomes are endogenously determined over time.  Firm performance may be both a result of the 
test variables (outside director equity compensation and agency costs) and a factor that influences subsequent 
changes in those variables.  To the extent subsequent compensation anchors on initial negotiation, models that do 
not take the initial anchoring into account may confound interpretation of resulting coefficients.  By using a sample 
of firms in the initial year of an outside director equity compensation plan, the study is better able to determine if the 
test variables reflect performance or vice versa, which begins to get to the root of the debate regarding outside 
director compensation.  
 
My study is subject to several limitations.  First, due to small sample size any generalization of these results 
to other firms should proceed with caution.  Also, the sample is from a time period prior to Sarbanes-Oxley.  Since 
the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley the demands, compensation, qualifications, and time commitments required by 
outside directors have changed dramatically.  While these results do shed light on the fundamental differences 
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among compensation components, director attitudes and responsibilities may have changed in such a way as to 
override these findings.  Third, the data is from a single country which does not allow me to generalize my findings 
to other markets.   
 
I have identified some useful future research ideas.  In my results the effects of equity compensation are not 
noticeable until three and five years after the plan adoption.  Therefore, future research could explain what factors 
speed up or slow down the implementation of governance reforms and how to make their effect more immediate.  In 
addition, the results are contrary to research by Boumosleh (2009) that indicates equity compensation provided 
monitoring disincentives for outside directors, particular in the manipulation of accruals.  One reason, perhaps, for 
the contrasting results would be my sample.  Since I use a sample of first time adopters, the long term effect of 
equity compensation is not tested.  It could be that governance reforms initially motivate directors to monitor more 
aggressively but fade over time.  Another potential area for research could investigate the stickiness of new 
governance mechanisms.  Related to this would be to investigate what causes outside directors to relax their 
integrity and the consequences of that behavior.  For example, Bøhren (1998) asked at what point is an agent 
indifferent to the dishonest use of private information and, therefore, derives no discomfort from using private 
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